Across the Border: Diaspora Links, Remittances and Youth Dialogue

AYP Committee Brief 2026/08 · Committee on Social Cohesion & Youth Dialogue

Desk-research brief · Published November 2026
Afghanistan Youth Parliament (AYP) – Think Tank Center

About this brief: a desk-research brief prepared by the AYP Think Tank Center for the Committee on Social Cohesion & Youth Dialogue. It rests only on published sources and is not a record of any meeting or committee decision. Review: internal desk review, November 2026 · Funding: none · Partners: none · Data: published secondary sources · Corrections: none to date. Not peer-reviewed.

Summary

Millions of Afghans live abroad, and almost every Afghan family has someone outside the country. The ties between them carry money, knowledge, news and opinion. They can bring people together or pull them apart. Remittances keep many households going, yet officially recorded flows fell sharply after 2021, sending money remains expensive, and connectivity cuts can break the link at the worst moment. For young people on both sides, the diaspora connection is also a conversation: about identity, about the country’s future and about who has the right to speak for whom. AYP can help make that conversation more respectful and that connection more useful.

At the end of 2025, UNHCR counted about 1.9 million Afghan refugees and asylum-seekers and a further 1.0 million Afghans in need of international protection abroad (UNHCR, 2026). The wider diaspora, including people with other residence status or citizenship, is larger still, but there is no single reliable count.

Key facts

  • Recorded remittances fell sharply after 2021. Officially recorded remittances to Afghanistan were about US$789 million in 2020, or 4.1% of GDP, and fell to about US$0.3 billion, or 1.5% of GDP, in 2021 (IOM GMDAC, Migration Data Portal, based on World Bank and KNOMAD data). World Bank data put recorded personal remittances at about US$320 million in 2024 (World Bank, World Development Indicators). Official figures do not capture money sent through informal channels such as hawala, so the true total is likely higher.
  • Remittances matter worldwide. Remittances sent to home countries reached about US$656 billion in 2023, and in more than 60 countries they equal 3% of GDP or more (World Bank, 2024).
  • Sending money is still costly. The global average cost of sending a remittance is 6.36% of the amount sent (World Bank, Remittance Prices Worldwide). The Sustainable Development Goals aim to reduce such costs to below 3% (World Bank, 2025).
  • Digital channels are growing. In 2025, more than 120,000 households in Afghanistan received humanitarian cash assistance through a digital payment platform (UNHCR, 2026), showing that digital transfers can reach families inside the country.
  • The link is fragile. UN human rights experts noted that the nationwide connectivity shutdown of September 2025 cut Afghans off from relatives abroad who send remittances (UN human rights experts, 2025).
  • Knowledge can travel too. IOM’s Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals project brought diaspora experts back to Afghanistan for short assignments. Researchers at UNU-MERIT and Maastricht University studied how such returns can build capacity through knowledge transfer, innovation and technological change (Siegel and Kuschminder, 2012).

What it means for young people

For a young person inside the country, a cousin or brother abroad may be the main source of income, advice and contacts. That brings support, but also pressure: expectations about migration, about money and about what one should think. For a young Afghan abroad, the link brings responsibility, sometimes guilt, and the feeling of being judged as either too distant or too involved.

These tensions show up online. Discussions between young Afghans inside and outside the country can turn sharp, with accusations of not understanding “real” conditions on one side and of silence or compromise on the other. Differences of language, region and political memory add to the strain. Left alone, such divisions harden.

There is also a great deal of shared ground. Young people in both places want work, education, safety and dignity for their families. Many in the diaspora have skills, networks and access to institutions that young people at home lack. Many at home have knowledge of local conditions that the diaspora needs if its help is to be useful. Dialogue is the bridge between these two kinds of knowledge.

Practical options for AYP and partners

  • Host structured youth dialogues across the border. Small, moderated online sessions that bring together young people inside and outside the country around a practical topic, such as finding work, continuing education or supporting returnees, build understanding more than open debates do. Clear rules, balanced participation by language and region, and trained moderators are essential.
  • Turn diaspora goodwill into skills transfer. AYP’s mentorship network, City Diplomats and Global University Network can connect diaspora professionals with young people inside the country for short, structured mentoring. The TRQN experience suggests that well-matched, short assignments can transfer real knowledge.
  • Share practical information on sending money. Plain guidance on comparing costs, using regulated and safe channels and protecting personal data can save families money. AYP should never handle money itself and should not promote any single company.
  • Plan for disconnection. Families can agree in advance on alternative ways to stay in touch during connectivity cuts. AYP can share simple guidance.
  • Encourage respectful language. Shared discussion guidelines for AYP channels, covering no insults, no hate speech and no labelling of whole groups, help protect cohesion among young people of different backgrounds.
  • For partners and host-country institutions: support lower-cost, regulated remittance channels; recognise diaspora skills programmes as development tools; and fund dialogue initiatives that include young people inside the country safely.

Next steps and questions for discussion

  • What do young people inside the country most want from the diaspora: mentoring, information, help with study applications, business links or simply regular contact?
  • What do diaspora professionals feel able to offer, how much time, and in which fields? AYP’s mentorship and City Diplomats programmes can ask volunteers directly.
  • Which discussion formats reduce hostility between young people inside and outside the country, and which make it worse? AYP can try small formats and learn from participants’ feedback.
  • How do remittance costs and channels differ between host countries, and what practical guidance would help families most?
  • How can dialogue sessions include young women and people from all language groups and regions in a balanced way?

Working Paper 2026/02, published alongside this brief, examines the diaspora’s role in more depth. Any data collection will follow the Research Standards: voluntary participation, a do-no-harm check and aggregate reporting only.

Limitations

Data on the Afghan diaspora and on remittances are incomplete. Recorded remittances miss informal flows, and the size of the diaspora depends on definitions. Evidence on the TRQN project dates from more than a decade ago. This brief does not assess specific money-transfer providers.

Related: Committee on Social Cohesion & Youth Dialogue · All committee briefs · Research Standards

References

  1. IOM GMDAC (n.d.). Remittances to and from Afghanistan. Migration Data Portal (based on World Bank and KNOMAD data). migrationdataportal.org
  2. Siegel, M. and Kuschminder, K. (2012). Highly skilled temporary return, technological change and innovation: the case of the TRQN project in Afghanistan. UNU-MERIT Working Paper 2012-017. migration.unu.edu
  3. UN human rights experts (2025). Statement on internet and social media restrictions in Afghanistan, 10 October 2025, as reported by The National. thenationalnews.com
  4. UNHCR (2026). Global Report 2025: Afghanistan situation overview. unhcr.org
  5. World Bank (2024). Remittances: KNOMAD brief, 18 September 2024. worldbank.org
  6. World Bank (2025). The cost of sending remittances is higher than 3% in 28 countries. World Bank Data Blog, 16 June 2025. blogs.worldbank.org
  7. World Bank (n.d.). Remittance Prices Worldwide (global average cost). remittanceprices.worldbank.org
  8. World Bank (n.d.). World Development Indicators: Personal remittances, received (current US$), Afghanistan, 2024 (as reported by Trading Economics). tradingeconomics.com

Afghanistan Youth Parliament (AYP) – Think Tank Center
AYP Committee Brief 2026/08 – November 2026
Corrections and comments: [email protected]