Afghanistan 2030: Scenarios for Youth, Skills and the Economy

AYP-TT Working Paper 2026/01 · Think Tank Center

Strategic foresight working paper · Published November 2026
Review status: internal review; external review pending (Research Standards §3)

Review status: internal review; external review pending (Research Standards §3). Review: internal review, November 2026 · Funding: none · Partners: none · Data: published secondary sources only; no AYP survey data · Corrections: none to date.

Abstract

1. Why look ahead, and why 2030

Afghanistan is often discussed in terms of the next emergency: the coming winter, the next wave of returns, the latest funding gap. That focus is understandable. It also makes it hard to plan beyond a single season. Young people, however, make long decisions: whether to keep studying, whether to migrate, whether to invest savings in a small business or a skill. Organisations that serve them, including AYP, need some view of the years ahead.

The year 2030 is close enough to be relevant to today’s decisions and far enough to allow real change. It is also the end point of the Sustainable Development Goals and of several projections used in this paper, such as UNICEF’s estimate of how many girls will be affected by restrictions on secondary education by 2030 (UNICEF Innocenti, 2026).

Strategic foresight does not try to predict the future. It tries to prepare for several futures at once. UNDP’s Foresight for Strategic Planning Toolkit, published in June 2026, describes the main tools used here: horizon scanning, scenarios, implications analysis and stress-testing plans against adverse conditions (UNDP, 2026b).

2. Methods note

Approach. This is a desk-based scenario study. It uses only published sources and contains no new data collection. It follows the AYP Research Standards: the Think Tank Center decides its own questions and methods, states its funding (none), and labels the paper’s review status openly.

Steps. (1) We reviewed recent reports on Afghanistan’s economy, labour market, education, health, migration, climate and connectivity, published mainly between 2024 and 2026. (2) We listed the main drivers of change and judged each by its likely impact on young people and by how uncertain its direction is to 2030. (3) We selected the two drivers that combine high impact with high uncertainty as the axes of a two-by-two scenario matrix. (4) We wrote a short narrative for each scenario, drawing on the evidence for the other drivers. (5) We identified signposts: observable indicators, with existing public sources, that would suggest which scenario is unfolding. (6) We drew out implications and actions that hold across scenarios.

What the scenarios are not. They are not predictions, and we do not assign probabilities. They do not take sides on political questions. Where governance matters, as it does for education and women’s work, we describe policy settings and their effects as reported by UN sources, without judging any actor.

Sources. Every number in the paper is cited to its source. Where sources disagree, as the World Bank and UNDP do on growth and population for 2025, we report both.

Limitations. See section 9.

3. Where things stand in 2026

People. The population is growing fast, driven by natural growth and by returns. The World Bank estimated population growth of 8.6% in 2025, largely due to returns; UNDP estimated 6.5% (World Bank, 2025; UNDP, 2026a). About 2.9 million people returned or were deported from Iran and Pakistan in 2025 alone (UNHCR, 2026a), and nearly five million since 2023 (UNDP, 2026a). Returns continued in 2026: about 426,700 people came back from Iran between January and August (UNHCR and IOM, 2026), and WFP reported more than 1.2 million forced returns from Iran and Pakistan by October (WFP, 2026).

Economy. Output is growing, but not as fast as population. The World Bank projected 4.3% growth in 2025 and a 4% fall in income per person (World Bank, 2025). UNDP estimated 1.9% real growth and a 2.1% fall in real GDP per person, a record trade deficit of US$11.3 billion, equal to about 60% of nominal GDP, a 16.5% fall in international aid in 2025, more than 80% of households in debt and about 28 million people in poverty (UNDP, 2026a).

Work. Total employment reached nearly 8.5 million in 2026, 14% above the 2022 low, but the employment-to-population ratio, at 32.5%, is still more than four points below 2020. Male employment is about 22% above 2020; women’s labour force participation is 5.1%. More than 70% of workers are in activities exposed at least moderately to energy-price and inflation pressures from the Middle East crisis (ILO, 2026). Nearly one in four young Afghans is unemployed (World Bank, 2025), and the formal sector provides only about 9% of jobs (BICC, 2025).

Learning. About 2.4 million girls are deprived of secondary education (UNESCO, 2026). UNICEF estimates that 3.8 million girls aged 7 to 18 were out of school in 2024 and that more than two million girls will be directly affected by secondary restrictions by 2030; it puts the economic cost at a minimum of about 0.5% of GDP a year and possibly around 1% (UNICEF Innocenti, 2026). Among young women, 78% are not in education, employment or training (UN Women, 2025).

Needs. The 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan estimates that 21.9 million people need assistance and seeks US$1.71 billion (OCHA, 2026). More than 422 health facilities closed in 2025 because of funding cuts (WHO, 2026). About 19.2 million people are projected to face high acute food insecurity between November 2026 and April 2027 (WFP, 2026).

Climate and water. Drought affected 64% of the country in 2025, and the share of people with adequate drinking water fell from 59% to 44% in a year (UNDP, 2026a). About 80% of water resources depend on snow and glacier melt, and Kabul’s groundwater is being drawn down faster than it is recharged (REACH, 2025).

Connectivity. About 11.3 million people used the internet in late 2025 (DataReportal, 2025). A nationwide shutdown of about 48 hours in September 2025 showed how quickly this lifeline can be cut (UN human rights experts, 2025).

4. Drivers of change to 2030

Driver 1: Demography and returns. A young, fast-growing population means that every year more people reach working age. Returns add to this, especially in border provinces and cities. This driver is relatively certain in direction (more young people seeking work) but uncertain in scale, because return flows depend on policies in Iran and Pakistan.

Driver 2: External finance, trade and prices. Aid has fallen and may fall further; humanitarian appeals are underfunded; the trade deficit is large; and energy and shipping disruptions linked to the Middle East crisis raise prices (ILO, 2026; UNDP, 2026a; WFP, 2026). Whether external finance stabilises, through trade, investment, remittances or renewed development funding, or keeps shrinking, is highly uncertain and has a large impact on jobs.

Driver 3: Access to learning and work, especially for women. Current restrictions on girls’ secondary and higher education and on women’s work are among the most consequential factors for the decade (UNICEF Innocenti, 2026; UN Women, 2025). Their future direction is uncertain. Even partial changes, such as wider access to vocational, health or online learning, would shift outcomes for millions.

Driver 4: Climate and water. Warming, repeated drought, floods and groundwater depletion are near-certain stresses (REACH, 2025; FEWS NET, 2025). Their exact timing is uncertain: 2026 brought better rains and strong harvests, while an expected El Niño raises flood risk (WFP, 2026).

Driver 5: Connectivity and digital policy. Mobile and internet access are growing, but remain limited and can be restricted (DataReportal, 2025; UN human rights experts, 2025). Digital access shapes learning, remote work, remittances and information.

Driver 6: Diaspora engagement. Remittances, skills and networks from Afghans abroad are a potential stabiliser, though recorded remittances fell sharply after 2021 (IOM GMDAC, n.d.). This driver is the subject of Working Paper 2026/02.

Selecting the axes. Drivers 1 and 4 are high-impact but relatively certain in direction; they shape every scenario. Drivers 5 and 6 are important but partly depend on the others. Drivers 2 and 3 combine high impact with high uncertainty. They form the two axes:

• Axis A, economic resilience: from a contracting economy (falling external finance, high prices, repeated shocks) to a stabilising economy (steadier trade, remittances and investment; growth at least keeping pace with population).
• Axis B, access to learning and work: from narrow access (current restrictions persist; few alternatives) to widening access (more pathways for young people, including young women, through formal, vocational, community or online routes).

5. Four scenarios for 2030

Scenario 1: Holding Pattern (stabilising economy, narrow access)

By 2030, the economy has found a low but steady footing. Trade with neighbours has grown, prices have calmed, and remittances flow more regularly through digital channels. Output grows a little faster than population in good years. Young men find work in construction, transport, trade and agriculture, mostly informal and poorly paid. The returns of 2024–2026 have been partly absorbed.

Access to learning and work for young women remains narrow. If restrictions persist, UNICEF’s projection that more than two million girls will be affected by 2030 becomes reality, and the loss of up to 25,400 skilled workers, including about 20,000 teachers and 5,400 health workers, is felt in schools and clinics (UNICEF Innocenti, 2026). The economy carries a permanent drag of roughly 0.5% to 1% of GDP each year from excluding women (UNICEF Innocenti, 2026). Skilled young people of both sexes look abroad.

What it feels like for a young person: there is work, but little progress. Stability without opportunity.

Scenario 2: Compound Strain (contracting economy, narrow access)

Several shocks arrive together. Aid continues to fall, price pressures from the wider region persist, a drought year follows a flood year, and returns continue at high levels. Household debt, already above 80% (UNDP, 2026a), deepens. Health services, which lost more than 422 facilities in 2025 (WHO, 2026), shrink further. Food insecurity stays high, close to or above the 19.2 million projected for the 2026–27 lean season (WFP, 2026).

Learning and work options for young women stay closed, and many young men drop out of school to earn. Rural youth move to cities and border areas, adding to informal settlements. Pressure to migrate grows, while routes abroad are harder and riskier.

What it feels like for a young person: survival first, plans later. The “waithood” described by researchers becomes a long-term condition (BICC, 2025).

Scenario 3: Learning against the Odds (contracting economy, widening access)

The economy remains under strain, as in Scenario 2. But pathways to learning widen, partly through policy and partly through community and digital alternatives. Community-based, home-based and online learning expand, often supported by the diaspora and by low-cost models that combine simple technology with regular human contact, the kind that improved learning in randomised trials elsewhere (Angrist, Bergman and Matsheng, 2022). Village-level learning brings girls in where distance had kept them out (Burde and Linden, 2013).

Jobs remain scarce, so many newly skilled young people work remotely, in home-based enterprises or abroad. The gains are real but uneven: connectivity cuts and payment barriers limit remote work, and certificates without recognition limit their value.

What it feels like for a young person: learning is possible, earning is hard. Skills become portable assets.

Scenario 4: Skills-Led Recovery (stabilising economy, widening access)

By 2030, steadier trade, regular remittances and targeted investment in water and agriculture allow growth to outpace population. Access to learning and work widens for young people, including young women, through a mix of formal, vocational and online routes. The return of women teachers and health workers to their professions eases shortages in schools and clinics, and avoids much of the 0.5% to 1% of GDP lost each year to exclusion (UNICEF Innocenti, 2026).

Returnees with skills from Iran, Pakistan and further afield are recognised and employed. Water-wise agriculture, food processing, construction, health and digital services absorb young workers. The diaspora shifts from emergency support toward investment and knowledge transfer.

What it feels like for a young person: a path from learning to earning becomes visible again.

Comparing the scenarios

Set side by side, the four scenarios show three things.

First, the economy alone does not decide young people’s prospects. Scenario 1 has a steadier economy than Scenario 3, yet young women in Scenario 3 may be better placed for the future, because they keep learning. Growth that excludes half of the young population carries a cost every year and builds a weaker workforce for the 2030s.

Second, access alone is not enough either. In Scenario 3, skills grow faster than jobs. Without stable demand, trained young people turn to remote work, home-based enterprise or migration. That is still better than no skills, but the full return on learning comes only when Axis A also improves, as in Scenario 4.

Third, some pressures are present in every scenario. Population growth, returns, climate stress and fragile connectivity appear in all four stories. They are not uncertainties to bet on; they are conditions to plan for. This is why the no-regret actions in section 8 focus on them.

A useful way to read the matrix is as a set of stress tests. A plan for youth employment that works only in Scenario 4 is a hope, not a plan. A plan that still delivers something useful in Scenario 2, for example portable skills, water-wise livelihoods and mentoring that continues during connectivity cuts, is robust. Donors and organisations can ask of each programme: what happens to it if the economy contracts, if access narrows further, or if a drought year follows a flood year?

Finally, the scenarios are not equally comfortable to discuss. Scenario 2 is painful, and Scenario 4 can sound naive. Both belong in the analysis. The aim of foresight is not to choose the most likely or the most hopeful future, but to make sure that decisions taken now are not surprised by any of them.

6. Signposts: what to watch

The following indicators, all with public sources, would suggest which scenario is unfolding. AYP intends to track them in future publications.

• Income per person: World Bank and UNDP estimates of real GDP per capita. Sustained decline points toward Scenarios 2 or 3; sustained growth toward 1 or 4.
• Employment and participation: ILO estimates of the employment-to-population ratio and women’s labour force participation. A rise in women’s participation from its current 5.1% would signal movement toward Scenarios 3 or 4.
• Education policy and enrolment: UNESCO and UNICEF statements and data on girls’ secondary and higher education, and on vocational and health training for women.
• Returns: monthly UNHCR and IOM return figures. Very high, sustained returns increase pressure in every scenario.
• Humanitarian funding: the share of the annual humanitarian appeal that is funded (OCHA), and the number of health facilities operating (WHO).
• Food security: IPC projections for each lean season (FAO and WFP).
• Climate: snowpack and seasonal outlooks (FEWS NET), and reported flood and drought impacts (OCHA).
• Connectivity: internet users (DataReportal) and any reported shutdowns or restrictions.
• Remittance costs and channels: World Bank remittance-price data and reports on digital transfer channels.

7. Implications

For young people

In every scenario, portable skills, those that can earn in a village, a city or abroad, hold their value. Digital literacy, numeracy, a trade, languages and the habit of continuous learning are a form of insurance. Young people should also expect volatility and keep options open: a skill that works offline, a network that spans inside and outside the country, and savings, however small.

For AYP

AYP’s role differs by scenario but rests on the same foundations: free, low-bandwidth learning; mentoring that connects young people with experienced professionals; careful data collection through the youth survey; and honest, sourced publications. In Scenarios 2 and 3, protection of participants and offline-capable materials matter most. In Scenarios 1 and 4, links to employers, recognition of skills and support for youth enterprise matter more.

For the diaspora

The diaspora can stabilise households through remittances in every scenario, but its larger potential lies in skills and knowledge: mentoring, remote teaching, short expert assignments and investment in small enterprises where conditions allow. In Scenario 3 especially, diaspora-supported learning could make the difference between a lost cohort and a skilled one. Working Paper 2026/02 explores these options.

For donors and partners

Plans that assume a single future are fragile. Funding that can shift between humanitarian relief, livelihoods and learning as signposts change is more resilient. The evidence also cautions against large, untested training programmes: many active labour market programmes in developing countries show no significant effect on employment or earnings (McKenzie, 2017). Smaller programmes with built-in evaluation, area-based approaches that include returnees and host communities (BICC, 2025), and sustained investment in water and climate resilience are more robust across scenarios.

8. No-regret actions

The following actions make sense in all four scenarios:

• Low-bandwidth, human-supported learning that works offline and includes regular contact with a mentor or tutor.
• Skills recognition for returnees and self-taught young people, through portfolios and practical tests.
• Water-wise livelihoods and climate preparedness for rural youth.
• Mentoring bridges between the diaspora and young people inside the country.
• Better data on young people’s lives, collected safely and reported honestly, including AYP’s own opt-in survey, whose results describe respondents only.
• Protection by design: minimal personal data, informed consent and safe channels in every activity.

9. Limitations

This paper relies on secondary sources, many of them modelled estimates or partial surveys. Key data, such as a recent national labour force survey, are not publicly available. Sources disagree on basic figures, including population growth. The scenarios simplify a complex reality into two axes; other drivers, such as regional security or major technological change, could reshape the picture. The paper has had internal review only; external review is pending under the Research Standards. Comments and corrections are welcome at [email protected].

Related: Think Tank Center · Working Paper 2026/02 · Committee briefs · Research Standards

References

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2. BICC – Mielke, K., Schmeidl, S. and Schetter, C. (2025). Responding to Mass Returns in Afghanistan. Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies. bicc.de
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21. World Bank (2025). Afghan economy expands amid persistent challenges. Press release on the Afghanistan Development Update, 10 December 2025. worldbank.org

Afghanistan Youth Parliament (AYP) – Think Tank Center
AYP-TT Working Paper 2026/01 – November 2026
Corrections and comments: [email protected]