The Diaspora as a Development Asset: Skills, Remittances and Knowledge Transfer

AYP-TT Working Paper 2026/02 · Think Tank Center

Evidence and policy working paper · Published November 2026
Review status: internal review; external review pending (Research Standards §3)

Review status: internal review; external review pending (Research Standards §3). Review: internal review, November 2026 · Funding: none · Partners: none · Data: published secondary sources only; no AYP survey data · Corrections: none to date.

Abstract

1. Introduction: why the diaspora matters now

The diaspora has always been part of Afghan life. Over decades of conflict and hardship, millions left, and many have built lives, careers and institutions abroad. Today, almost every Afghan family has a member outside the country.

Three developments make the diaspora’s role more important now than a few years ago. First, external aid is shrinking: international aid fell by 16.5% in 2025 (UNDP, 2026). Second, the economy is growing more slowly than its population, so income per person is falling (World Bank, 2025a; UNDP, 2026). Third, the exclusion of women and girls from much of education and work means that knowledge and opportunity must increasingly come from outside formal domestic institutions: women’s labour force participation stands at 5.1% (ILO, 2026), and about 2.4 million girls are deprived of secondary education (UNESCO, 2026).

In this context, the diaspora is not only a source of emergency support. It is potentially a development asset: a store of skills, savings, networks and influence that could help young Afghans learn, earn and stay connected to the world. Whether that potential is realised depends on how engagement is organised.

2. Methods note

Approach. This is a desk review of published sources from international institutions, universities and research organisations, with official statistics where available. It does not include new data collection or interviews.

Questions. (1) What is known about the size of the Afghan diaspora and the flows it sends home? (2) What evidence exists on skills and knowledge transfer? (3) What constrains diaspora engagement? (4) Which policy options are practical for AYP and its partners?

Framework. We organise the evidence around three channels: money (remittances and investment), skills (knowledge transfer, mentoring and teaching) and networks (links to institutions, markets and public debate). This framing follows the broad approach of international diaspora policy, which treats diaspora engagement as a long-term development force across economic, human and social dimensions (IOM, 2022).

Standards. The paper follows the AYP Research Standards. All figures are cited. Where data are partial or dated, this is stated. The paper has had internal review; external review is pending.

Limitations. See section 9.

3. What the evidence shows

3.1 Size and spread

There is no single reliable count of the Afghan diaspora. The clearest official figure covers people in need of international protection: at the end of 2025, UNHCR reported about 1.9 million Afghan refugees and asylum-seekers and a further 1.0 million other Afghans in need of international protection (UNHCR, 2026). The wider diaspora, including people who have become citizens of other countries, labour migrants and students, is larger, but estimates depend on definitions.

The diaspora is also on the move. About 2.9 million people returned or were deported to Afghanistan from Iran and Pakistan in 2025 (UNHCR, 2026). Many families that had a member earning in a neighbouring country now have that member back home, often without work. This is a loss of income for households and a sign that the “near diaspora” in neighbouring countries is shrinking, while the “far diaspora” in Europe, North America and elsewhere becomes relatively more important.

3.2 Money

Recorded remittances fell sharply. Officially recorded remittances to Afghanistan were about US$789 million in 2020, equal to 4.1% of GDP, and dropped to about US$0.3 billion, or 1.5% of GDP, in 2021 (IOM GMDAC, n.d.). World Bank data show recorded personal remittances of about US$320 million in 2024 (World Bank, WDI). These figures do not include money sent through informal channels such as hawala, so the real total is likely higher, but the decline in recorded flows is clear.

Remittances matter at global scale. Remittances sent home worldwide reached about US$656 billion in 2023, and in more than 60 countries they equal at least 3% of GDP; small and fragile states depend on them most (World Bank, 2024).

Costs remain high. The global average cost of sending a remittance is 6.36% of the amount sent (World Bank, Remittance Prices Worldwide), well above the Sustainable Development Goal target of less than 3% (World Bank, 2025b). For a family receiving US$100 a month, the difference between 6% and 3% is a meaningful sum over a year.

Digital channels are possible. In 2025, UNHCR delivered digital cash assistance to more than 120,000 households in Afghanistan through a digital payment platform (UNHCR, 2026). This shows that digital transfers can reach households inside the country, at least for humanitarian purposes.

The link is fragile. When connectivity was shut down nationwide for about 48 hours in September 2025, UN human rights experts noted that Afghans were cut off from relatives abroad who send remittances, with harm to the economy and to livelihoods (UN human rights experts, 2025).

3.3 Skills and knowledge

Short expert returns. IOM’s Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals (TRQN) project brought diaspora professionals back to Afghanistan for short assignments in public institutions. Researchers at UNU-MERIT and Maastricht University used the project to study how short-term returns can build capacity through knowledge transfer, innovation and technological change (Siegel and Kuschminder, 2012). The model is relevant today in adapted form, including remote assignments where travel is not possible or safe.

Remote teaching and mentoring. Evidence from outside Afghanistan shows that simple remote support can improve learning. In Botswana, weekly short phone calls from tutors combined with text messages improved numeracy by about 0.12 standard deviations and reduced innumeracy by 31%, at a cost of about US$19 per child; text messages alone had no significant effect (Angrist, Bergman and Matsheng, 2022). Diaspora volunteers could provide this kind of structured, low-tech contact at scale.

Online higher education. Accredited online programmes already reach some Afghan learners. The University of the People reported more than 3,100 Afghan women studying with it in 2024, and more than 26,000 applications since August 2021 (University of the People, 2024). Diaspora academics and professionals can support such learners as mentors, tutors and referees.

3.4 Networks and organisations

Afghan diaspora organisations exist in many host countries, but their capacity and links home vary widely. A study of 85 Afghan diaspora organisations in six European countries found that no single factor explains how active they are across borders; it is combinations of conditions, with external funding playing a notable role in some. Organisations in Germany and the Netherlands showed stronger ties to Afghanistan than those in Austria and Sweden, which focused more on local activities in their host countries (Safi and Czaika, 2025).

Earlier mapping for the Danish Refugee Council’s Diaspora Programme, carried out by the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance and UNU-MERIT, combined 103 interviews, consultation meetings and desk review to assess Afghan diaspora organisations in Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom and to recommend ways to strengthen their engagement (MGSoG and UNU-MERIT, n.d.).

At the international level, the Dublin Declaration, adopted at the Global Diaspora Summit co-hosted by IOM and the Government of Ireland in April 2022, calls for diaspora engagement to be institutionalised across policies, programmes and partnerships, and supported by 30 countries and the African Union (IOM, 2022).

4. Three channels, one purpose

The evidence suggests that each channel has a distinct strength.

Money stabilises households in the short term. It pays for food, rent, school costs and medical care. It is the most immediate and most widespread form of diaspora support, but on its own it rarely builds lasting capacity, and it is vulnerable to costs, regulation and connectivity cuts.

Skills build capacity in the longer term. A diaspora engineer who mentors five young technicians, or a nurse abroad who helps design a first-aid course in Farsi-e-Dari and Pashto, leaves something that continues after the contact ends. Skills transfer is slower to organise than sending money, but its effects compound.

Networks open doors that neither money nor skills can open alone: a university place, a recommendation for a scholarship, a buyer for a women’s cooperative’s products, or a fair hearing for young people’s views in international debate.

For young people inside the country, the most valuable diaspora engagement combines all three. A short mentoring relationship (skills) that leads to an online course and a scholarship application (networks), supported by a small family remittance to pay for internet access (money), is a complete pathway. AYP’s role is to help build such pathways.

5. Constraints and risks

Data gaps. No reliable count of the diaspora exists, and recorded remittance data miss informal flows. Programmes are often designed without knowing who is willing to contribute what.

Cost and access. High transfer costs reduce the value of remittances. Many young people inside the country lack bank accounts or mobile money; UN Women reports that men are nearly three times as likely as women to have a bank account or use mobile money (UN Women, 2025).

Connectivity. Remote mentoring, teaching and transfers depend on networks that can be slow, expensive or cut.

Safety. Contact with people abroad can create risks for young people inside the country if it becomes visible in the wrong way. Every programme must minimise personal data and avoid exposing participants.

Polarisation. Debates between diaspora and home communities can become sharp and divisive. Engagement that is seen as political, or as speaking for people at home without listening to them, loses trust.

Fragmentation and dependence. Diaspora organisations are often small and volunteer-led. Where external funding drives activity (Safi and Czaika, 2025), engagement may rise and fall with grant cycles.

Unrealistic expectations. Large training or job programmes do not automatically produce results. A review of active labour market programmes in developing countries found that many showed no significant effect on employment or earnings (McKenzie, 2017). Diaspora programmes should start small, measure results and scale what works.

6. Policy options

6.1 For AYP

• Create a structured diaspora contribution route. Professionals abroad can offer a defined amount of time, for example one hour a week for three months, as mentors, tutors, course reviewers or Think Tank reviewers. Each role should have a clear description, a short orientation and the reference requirements AYP already uses for mentors.
• Use the “phone plus person” model. Pair diaspora volunteers with learners in AYP courses for short, regular check-ins by message or call, following the low-tech evidence. Track completion and learning outcomes.
• Build bridges through existing programmes. City Diplomats, Country Ambassadors and the Global University Network can connect host-city institutions, universities and employers with young people inside the country, for example through scholarship guidance or remote internships where safe and legal.
• Keep money out of AYP’s hands. AYP has no bank account and should not handle remittances or donations for individuals. It can share neutral guidance on comparing transfer costs and using regulated channels.
• Invite diaspora experts into quality assurance. Diaspora academics can serve as external reviewers for AYP-TT Working Papers, helping meet the two-reviewer requirement of the Research Standards.
• Measure and publish results. Simple indicators, such as mentoring pairs formed, sessions held, courses completed and scholarship applications submitted, should be reported openly, with no personal data.

6.2 For diaspora organisations

• Specialise and partner. The evidence on Afghan diaspora organisations suggests that combinations of capacity, links and funding drive transnational activity (Safi and Czaika, 2025). Smaller organisations can achieve more by focusing on one area, such as health, education or enterprise, and partnering with others.
• Listen first. Programmes designed with young people inside the country, rather than for them, are more likely to meet real needs and to be trusted.
• Protect participants. Apply strict privacy and do-no-harm practices in every activity.

6.3 For host-country institutions and donors

• Lower the cost of sending money. Support regulated, low-cost remittance channels in line with the SDG target of under 3% (World Bank, 2025b).
• Recognise diaspora skills programmes as development tools. Fund short expert assignments, remote mentoring and online teaching, building on the TRQN experience (Siegel and Kuschminder, 2012) and on the Dublin Declaration’s call to institutionalise diaspora engagement (IOM, 2022).
• Fund multi-year, flexible engagement. Short grant cycles produce short-lived engagement. Modest, multi-year support for diaspora organisations allows them to build capacity.
• Support data. Fund better estimates of the diaspora, its skills and its transfers, with strong privacy protection.

6.4 For universities

• Offer places, credit recognition and supervision. Diaspora academics can champion Afghan learners within their institutions, supervise remote research projects and help design bridging courses.

6.5 Six design principles

Drawing the evidence together, six principles can guide any diaspora engagement programme, whether run by AYP, a diaspora organisation or a donor.

1. Start from demand at home. The question is not “what can the diaspora offer?” but “what do young people inside the country need, and which of those needs can someone abroad help with?” Short consultations with young people, and the demand mapping proposed in Committee Brief 2026/01, should come first.

2. Make contributions small, regular and defined. One hour a week for three months is easier to commit to, and easier to manage, than an open-ended offer of help. Clear roles reduce disappointment on both sides.

3. Combine technology with human contact. The Botswana trial showed that messages alone did little, while messages plus a short call worked (Angrist, Bergman and Matsheng, 2022). Platforms should serve relationships, not replace them.

4. Protect people by design. Collect the minimum personal data, use pen names where needed, never publish faces or locations without informed consent, and plan for connectivity cuts.

5. Keep money and influence transparent. Funding sources, partners and any conflicts of interest should be stated openly, as the AYP Research Standards require for research. Where money is involved, it should flow through regulated channels, not through informal intermediaries chosen by the programme.

6. Measure, publish and adjust. A small programme that measures its results honestly and changes course when something does not work is more valuable than a large one that cannot show what it achieved (McKenzie, 2017).

6.6 Questions for the next stage of research

This paper is a desk review. Several questions need primary research, which AYP’s Think Tank Center may take up in future, subject to its ethics and do-no-harm procedures:

• What skills are most in demand among young people inside the country, by region and gender, and which of them can be supported remotely?
• What share of diaspora professionals would volunteer regular time, in which fields, and what would help them stay engaged?
• What do young people at home see as respectful and useful diaspora engagement, and what do they find unhelpful?
• How do remittance costs and channels differ by corridor, and how have digital channels changed access for women?
• What learning gains result from structured remote mentoring in AYP courses, measured with simple before-and-after assessments?

Answers to these questions would allow future papers to move from general options to tested, evidence-based programmes.

7. The diaspora across the 2030 scenarios

Working Paper 2026/01 sets out four scenarios for 2030. The diaspora’s role differs in each:

• In Holding Pattern, remittances help stabilise households and diaspora networks support the minority of young people who can learn online. The risk is that the diaspora becomes a channel for skilled young people to leave.
• In Compound Strain, remittances become a lifeline, and connectivity cuts make that lifeline fragile. Diaspora support for basic needs and safe information matters most.
• In Learning against the Odds, the diaspora can make the decisive difference, as tutors, mentors and links to accredited programmes.
• In Skills-Led Recovery, the diaspora can shift toward investment, enterprise partnerships and returning expertise.

In every scenario, the most robust contribution is the same: structured, safe transfer of skills and access to networks, alongside money.

8. What to monitor

• Recorded remittance flows and transfer costs (World Bank data).
• The number and size of diaspora mentoring and teaching initiatives, including AYP’s own.
• Connectivity and shutdown reports.
• Learning outcomes of remote mentoring, measured simply and reported in aggregate.
• Diaspora organisations’ capacity and partnerships, through periodic mapping.

9. Limitations

This paper relies on secondary sources. The size of the diaspora and the full value of remittances are unknown. Evidence on skills transfer in Afghanistan is limited and dated, and evidence on remote learning comes mainly from other countries. The paper does not evaluate specific organisations or money-transfer providers. It has had internal review only; external review is pending under the Research Standards. Comments and corrections are welcome at [email protected].

Related: Think Tank Center · Working Paper 2026/01 · Committee Brief 2026/08 · Research Standards

References

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Afghanistan Youth Parliament (AYP) – Think Tank Center
AYP-TT Working Paper 2026/02 – November 2026
Corrections and comments: [email protected]